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THE POWER TO REGULATE PEOPLE: Moore v. City of
East Cleveland
INTRODUCTION
The Village of Euclid and the City of East Cleveland are
adjacent suburban coumunities located northeast of Cleveland.
Both Euclid and East Cleveland passed zoning ordinances which
when challenged as constitutionally invalid became the subjects
of review and decision by the United States Supreme Court.'
The two decisions, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
and Moore v. City of East Cleveland,3 were handed down more
than fifty years apart, and they represent two of the four times4
the Supreme Court has spoken out on the power of municipalities
to regulate land use through zoning.5
A subtle but significant change has taken place in the zoning
powers of municipalities during the span of years between Euclid
and Moore: What began in 1926 as the power to regulate the uses
of land' has expanded in 1977 to include the power to regulate the
people who use the land.7
The analysis of this evolution will be in three parts: First, a
brief summary of the two cases which gave rise to the new power,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas8 and Moore; second, a discussion
I Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
' Three other Supreme Court cases in the 1970's interpret zoning ordinances, without
tracing the origins of zoning power back to Euclid. Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metropoli-
tan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court in Euclid
upheld a complex zoning scheme which divided the village into various classes of use
districts, ranging from single family dwellings to heavy industrial uses. Id. at 389-91.
7 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See Frame & Scorza, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Property
Rights, Personal Rights & the Liberal Regime,2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935 (1975); Note,
An Extension of the State's Police Power: The Protection of Family Values Through
Zoning Litigation, 21 Loy. L. REv. 243 (1975).
x 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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of the confines of the so-called "two-tier" equal protection analy-
sis which led to Belle Terre; and third, an analysis of Moore as a
response to Belle Terre.
I. THE CASES
A. Belle Terre
The Village of Belle Terre passed an ordinance restricting
land use to single-family dwellings, defining "family" to include
one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, or
not more than two unrelated persons living as a single housekeep-
ing unit.' The owners of a house in Belle Terre leased it to six
unrelated students. When notified that they were in violation of
the ordinance, the owners and three of the students sought to
have the ordinance declared unconstitutional. 0 The district court
sustained the ordinance," but the court of appeals struck down
the ordinance as violative of equal protection.
The Supreme Court reversed, using an equal protection anal-
ysis: Since the ordinance did not infringe on any fundamental
right it was to be given only a minimum level of scrutiny.'" Justice
Douglas, 4 writing for the majority, cursorily dismissed the con-
tention that the ordinance encroached on any "fundamental
right" guaranteed by the Constitution. 5 Rather, the opinion em-
Id. at 2.
0 d. at 2-3.
367 F. Supp. 136, 148-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
12 476 F.2d 806, 818 (2d Cir. 1973). The court of appeals had departed from the
traditional "two-tier" analysis. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Gunther], asking instead "whether the
legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute." Boraas
v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973).
*3 The Court used the so-called "two-tier" approach. See notes 43-75 infra.
I* Many people had expected Douglas to classify the choice of household living com-
panions as a civil liberty not to be interfered with by the state, especially considering his
concurring opinion one year earlier in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
543 (1973). Criticism of the apparent inconsistency between his views in Moreno and Belle
Terre has been strong. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 17-18 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Margolis, Exclusionary Zoning: For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll, 11 CALIF.
W.L. REV. 85 (1974); Note, No Dogs, Cats or Voluntary Families Allowed, 24 DEPAuL L.
REV. 784 (1975).
" 416 U.S. at 7-8. The "fundamental rights" which have been held to trigger strict
scrutiny are: The right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to
vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right of association,
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); the right of access to courts, NAACP v. Button,
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phasized the wide latitude given to the state in its exercise of
police power:"6 "It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people."' 7
Justice Marshall dissented," stating that the classification
distinguishing related and unrelated people "burden[ed] the
students' fundamental rights of association and privacy guaran-
teed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."' 9 The judicial
deference generally given to legislative determinations did not
require abdication of judicial responsibility to protect basic con-
stitutional rights.20 By attempting to regulate "the way people
choose to associate with each other within the privacy of their
own homes," 2' Belle Terre had unconstitutionally interfered with
fundamental rights.
B. Moore
Belle Terre appeared to be conclusive: Broad judicial defer-
ence must be given to local zoning officials in the exercise of their
police power, and that power includes the power to regulate the
internal composition of the household.
Three years later, however, the Court tempered its Belle
Terre holding in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.22 Petitioner
Inez Moore lived with her son and two grandchildren. The grand-
children were first cousins rather than brothers, one being the
child of her son and the other the child of her deceased daughter.,
Because of the city's definition of "fai.m'ly" in its single-family
zoning ordinance, 4 Mrs. Moore was notified that one of her
grandchildren was an "illegal occupant." When she refused to
371 U.S. 415 (1963); the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
the right of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
* See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
* 416 U.S. at 9.
* Id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
* Id. at 13. The fundamental rights of association and privacy are included in note
15 supra.
" 416 U.S. at 13-14.
" Id. at 17.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 496-97.
' The East Cleveland ordinance defined "family" members by their relation to the
nominal head of the household. The complex provision is found at 431 U.S. 496 n.2.
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remove the child, Mrs. Moore was convicted of violating the ordi-
nance. 5 On appeal she challenged its constitutionality.
East Cleveland's ordinance, and Mrs. Moore's claim of inval-
idity, were substantially similar to the ordinance and claim the
Court had reviewed three years earlier in Belle Terre. Both ordi-
nances dealt with single-family zones, and attempted to define
"family" in a restrictive fashion. Both purported to serve tradi-
tional zoning objectives: Preventing overcrowding, minimizing
traffic and parking congestion, preserving a neighborhood free of
disturbing noises.26 Both ordinances recognized the importance of
the "family."" Most importantly, both ordinances went beyond
the traditional scope of zoning set forth in Euclid,"5 regulating the
use of land, and sought to regulate who may use the land and in
what manner.
29
Despite some similarity, the Court chose to distinguish Belle
Terre by creating a new fundamental right of "family" and by
using substantive due process analysis instead of equal protection
analysis.
The Court, Justice Powell writing for the majority, began by
describing the effect of East Cleveland's ordinance. Unlike Belle
Terre, East Cleveland had attempted to regulate its housing by
slicing deeply-into the family itself: "On its face, [the East Cleve-
land ordinance] selects certain categories of relatives who may
live together and declares that others may not. In particular, it
makes a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson
.... "30 The opinion then discussed the constitutional issue of
the case: whether the ordinance violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.3' The usual rule of judicial defer-
ence to legislative discretion was inappropriate here because the
" Id. at 497.
" Id. at 499-500; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 5, 9.
" Belle Terre sought to protect the "extended family," while East Cleveland provided
protection to the "nuclear family." See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 507-
510 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). See note 6 supra.
" Only Justice Stevens perceived the distinction. He saw the critical issue as the
extent to which courts should allow interference with a property owner's right to determine
the internal composition of his household. 431 U.S. 494, 518-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 498-99.
" The Court found it unnecessary to reach Mrs. Moore's contention that the ordi-
nance was violative of the equal protection clause. Id. at 496 n.3.
VOL. 55
MOORE v. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND
legislature had intruded on the freedom of choice in matters of
marriage and family life.32 Justice Powell noted that the Court
had consistently recognized some private realm of family life
which the state would not be allowed to penetrate.3 3 Governmen-
tal intrusion into this realm was subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny.34 The Court ruled that when such scrutiny was applied, the
ordinance had to fall because the governmental interests ad-
vanced were not sufficient to justify the city's intrusion on a
fundamental right.-
Justice Powell clearly recognized the need for "caution and
restraint" whenever the Court proceeded to review legislation on
substantive due process grounds. The pitfalls of the Lochner-
years, when the Court took on powers of judicial intervention as
a "super-legislature, ' ' 37 served as a warning to courts that inter-
vention must be exercised with great care.m But judicial interfer-
ence was appropriate, even essential, when government impinged
on "the sanctity of the family." 39
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice
Powell's majority opinion." Justice Stevens gave the Court its
bare majority in striking down the ordinance, but he concurred
only in the judgment, not in the opinion of the majority."
The four dissenting Justices filed three separate opinions
Id. at 499.
Id. The Court listed numerous cases in support of the "private family realm,"
though none of the cases had specified any definitive boundaries of that realm. Id.
4' Id.
11 Id. at 499-500. East Cleveland had attempted to justify the ordinance as a measure
designed to alleviate overcrowding and undue financial burdening of its school system.
The Court ruled that the particular ordinance before the Court had but a tenuous relation
to alleviation of those problems. Id.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1904). See text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
37 The terminology is taken from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964),
wherein the Court refused to use Lochner as a guide. Id. at 482.
R "[There is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of the Court."
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 502.
a Id. at 503.
, Id. at 506 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 513. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens rested his opinion on proce-
dural due process: "[Tihere [does not) appear to be any justification for such a restric-
tion on an owner's use of his property . . . .East Cleveland's unprecedented ordinance




with varying reasons for their disagreement.2
II. THE CONFINES OF THE Two-TIER ANALYSIS
A. Development of and Difficulties with the Two-Tier Approach
Around the turn of the century, a series of cases culminating
in Lochner v. New York"3 had established a policy of judicial
intervention on substantive due process grounds." This policy, in
reality a substitution of judicial notions of public policy for legis-
lative choices, was gradually abandoned in the 1930's.45 During
the years of the Warren Court, however, intervention by the
Court regained limited acceptance. This time, rather than relying
on the due process clause, the Court began to use equal protection
analysis in examining state legislation. Whenever a legislative
classification impinged on a "fundamental right" or involved a
"suspect classification," that legislation was subjected to strict
scrutiny by the Court and was struck down unless the state could
offer a compelling state interest to overcome its constitutional
frailty. The list of fundamental rights and suspect classifications
was finite, 6 but application of the high level of scrutiny was vir-
tually always fatal."7 Though never formally adopted by the
Court, 8 the "two-tier" analysis, strict versus minimal scrutiny,
became the standard of the Warren Court.
49
,1 Chief Justice Burger dissented on procedural grounds-Mrs. Moore's failure to
exhaust her administrative remedies. Id. at 521. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist viewed
Belle Terre as controlling on most issues, and they dissented primarily because of their
belief that the Court possessed limited powers of intervention. Id. at 531-35. Justice White
disagreed with the Court's use of substantive due process. Id. at 541.
' 198 U.S. 45 (1904).
" See generally, G. GUNTHER, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-656
(1975).
" See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
'6 For a general list of fundamental rights, see note 15 supra. The most common
suspect classifications triggering strict scrutiny are: Race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886); and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
" The one notable exception is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national security upheld as a compelling state interest for the confinement of Japanese
during World War II).
" See Note, Equal Protection: Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN. L.J.
687 n.1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court].
" The approach of the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is illustra-
tive of the two-tier analysis. In Shapiro, the Court invalidated three state laws which
defined welfare benefits to persons not meeting the one-year residency requirement, stat-
ing:
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Difficulties inherent in the two-tier system soon became ap-
parent.5 0 On the one hand, application of the two-tier approach
seemed straightforward: Interference with a fundamental right
or suspect class would not be tolerated, and the statute would be
stricken; absent such interference, the statute would be upheld.'
On the other hand, the enumerated fundamental rights were so
imprecise that it was difficult to discern when legislation in-
fringed on a fundamental right. Therefore, the Court was able to
intervene freely and strike down statutes merely by spinning
analogies to previously enumerated rights .52 Dissatisfaction with
the two-tier approach grew in the Supreme Court, expressed most
vocally by Justice Marshall."
The Burger Court seemed to move away from the rigidity of
the two-tier system toward an intermediate standard of scrutiny.
Some decisions of the early seventies marked an apparent
change. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 4 for example,
the Court invalidated a Louisiana workman's compensation
statute which denied recovery to an illegitimate child, stating:
"[Wihen some statutory classifications approach sensitive and
fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scru-
tiny . . . . The essential inquiry in all [these] cases is . . . :
What legitimate state interest does the classification promote?
What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?""
While a Weber-type approach was followed in a subsequent
decision in the same year,56 it was never accepted as a replace-
[Wie reject appellant's argument that a mere showing of a rational relation-
ship between the waiting period and . . . permissible state objectives will
suffice to justify the classification . . . [Aippellees were exercising [their]
constitutional right [to travel], and any classification which serves to penal-
ize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.
Id. at 634 (citations omitted).
" An exhaustive treatment of the "two-tier" approach and its vagaries is contained
in Note, Developments-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1123-24 (1969).
, See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
" See Gunther, supra note 12, at 10.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-130 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
Id. at 172-73.
" Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
1978
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ment of the two-tier system. On the contrary, there were diver-
gent views as to which standard the Court might apply in future
cases. One commentator forecast the arrival of a "means-
oriented" approach;57 Justice Marshall advocated a "sliding-
scale" approach.5 But none of these was ever formally adopted
by the Court. 59
B. Belle Terre and the Two-Tier Approach
1. Background
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance in the zoning
area,6 0 courts addressing precisely the same issue-the extent to
which a local zoning ordinance may interfere with the choice of




A New Jersey court struck down a zoning ordinance with a
restrictive definition of "family" on substantive due process
grounds. 2 A federal court in Wisconsin struck down a similar
statute using equal proteciion analysis and an intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny. 3 An Illinois court ignored constitutional issues
altogether, ruling that the legislature was not authorized to pass
a zoning ordinance which regulated the internal composition of
households. 4 And finally, a federal court in California upheld a
restrictive definition of "family" after, deciding that neither equal
protection nor due process applied.65
7 Gunther, supra note 12, at 20-21.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
" See Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, supra note 48, at 716.
0 See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
" See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973). The dearth
of Supreme Court zoning cases provided the judge with little guidance as to the Burger
Court's approach to equal protection analysis. It was unclear whether minimum or strict
scrutiny or some intermediate standard should be applied. See text accompanying notes
50-59 supra. His decision upholding the ordinance relied on similar state cases and his
belief that the Burger Court had an intermediate standard of scrutiny-both were grounds
for Supreme Court reversal. See text accompanying notes 9-21 supra.
"2 Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251-52, 281 A.2d 513,
518 (1971).
Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 438, 216 N.E.2d 116, 120 (1966).
" Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 487
F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
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2. Belle Terre
The court of appeals opinion in Belle Terre"6 represented the
Second Circuit's attempt to find the appropriate constitutional
standard for examining restrictive definitions of family. The
court's inquiry was limited to whether the zoning ordinance's
unequal classification-allowing occupancy to more than two
members of a traditional family while denying occupancy to a
"voluntary" family- 7 violated the equal protection clause.
After deciding that the traditional "fundamental" rights
were not affected and therefore strict scrutiny was inappro-
priate,6 8 the court ruled that it was not limited by the rigidity of
the two-tier formula: "[Tihe Supreme Court appears to have
moved from this rigid dichotomy. . . toward a more flexible and
equitable approach . . . .Under this approach the test for appli-
cation of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the
statute." 9 This ordinance had the purpose and effect of compel-
ling Belle Terre residents to conform to the community's prevail-
ing social preferences; as such, the ordinance had no relevance to
the public health, safety, or welfare, and was thus invalid. 0
The Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals had a
two-fold effect. First, the Court did what the court of appeals said
was not possible: It justified the restrictive ordinance under the
traditional zoning objectives.7 The Supreme Court expanded the
concept of the general welfare to include the power to promote
family values.7"
Second, Belle Terre confirmed the application of the "two-
tier" approach in zoning cases, and rejected the court of appeals'
'7 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 812.
' Id. at 813-14. The court acknowledged that the rights of privacy, association, and
travel asserted by the plaintiffs were important, but that they did not "fit snugly" into
any of the Supreme Court's previously recognized categories of fundamental rights. Id. at
814.
" Id. at 814 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 815.
" See Note, The Entrenchment of the Traditional Family Structure, 13 J. FAM. L.
901, 905 (1973-74).
' Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9. See also Note, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas-A
Reaffirmation & Strengthening of the Police Power, 4 CAP. U.L. REv. 157, 164 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Strengthening of the Police Power].
1978
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choice of an intermediate, flexible level of scrutiny.' :' Justice
Douglas' review was brief and conclusive: No fundamental rights
were involved, nor was the ordinance aimed at transients." Such
a restrictive definition of family was permissible within the exer-
cise of the police power.75 In short, strict scrutiny would be ap-
plied only to ordinances infringing on previously enumerated fun-
damental rights, and these rights would be strictly construed;
minimal scrutiny would be the standard for all other ordinances.
III. Moore: RESPONDING TO Belle Terre
The inflexibility of the "two-tier" approach, specifically
adopted in the zoning area by the Supreme Court, became appar-
ent in Moore. The injustice of an ordinance which "makes a crime
of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson"7 was clear
enough, but the Court had confined itself to an either-or choice:
Either find a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny and
force the government to show a compelling state interest justify-
ing the ordinance, or allow the injustice to remain after a minimal
amount of scrutiny.
Belle Terre had established a strong precedent, the applica-
tion of minimum scrutiny of zoning cases. In Moore, the Supreme
Court was forced to use two techniques to circumvent the con-
straints of its earlier decision. First, the Court avoided equal pro-
tection altogether, resting its decision within the contours of sub-
stantive due process.77 The Court offered no explanation for its
choice of due process instead of equal protection, but it seemed
to take comfort in the imprecision of the due process clause itself.
The Court quoted at length from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
v. Ullman,7s including:
IT]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This
"liberty" ... is a rational continuum which recognizes what a rea-
sonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require
See Strengthening of the Police Power, supra note 72, at 164.
4 416 U.S. at 7-8.
7 See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
" Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499.
Id. at 496 n.3.
7- 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment."
The Court recognized that its decision marked a reentry into
the treacherous field of substantive due process, 0 but the Court's
hesitance would not override its duty to strike down an arbitrary
cutting off of protected family rights."
A second and more significant way that the Court avoided
its Belle Terre reasoning was by creating a new fundamental
right, the right of family for related individuals.82 Plaintiffs in
Belle Terre had unsuccessfully claimed that the Village's ordi-
nance infringed on their fundamental right of privacy, associa-
tion, and travel.8 3 For the Supreme Court in Moore to return to
any of these rights as a means of invoking strict scrutiny would
have been difficult without overruling, or at least emasculating
Belle Terre.
Though it is too early to forecast the effect of the Court's
resurrection of substantive due process, the Court's creation of a
new fundamental right is likely to have several immediate and
possibly profound consequences. Specifically, two issues have
been raised by Moore: First, how can local zoning authorities
reconcile the two Supreme Court holdings, Moore and Belle
Terre, in drafting future single-family ordinances? And second,
what are the perimeters of the newly established right of family?
A. Reconciliation
At first blush, reconciliation of the two decisions seems fairly
straightforward. Justice Powell's majority opinion saw Belle
Terre as distinguishable from Moore.84 The Belle Terre ordinance
made a clear cut and reasonable distinction between related and
unrelated people, and it purported to promote "family needs"
and "family values. ' s5 East Cleveland's ordinance on the other
hand, made no such rational distinction; the city's scheme arbi-
trarily "selects certain categories of relatives who may live to-
gether and declares that others may not. '8 6
" Id. at 542-43, quoted in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499.
" See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
" 431 U.S. at 502.
K2 See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
" See text accompanying note 74 supra.
', 431 U.S. at 498.
" Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9.
' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 498-99.
1978
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The distinction between the two cases was clear especially in
light of the different plaintiffs in each case: Six college students
with no familial ties in Belle Terre;" a grandmother separated
from her orphaned grandchild in Moore.S8 The clarity of the
related-unrelated distinction begins to fade, however, when the
contrast between potential plaintiffs is not so extreme. Justice
Marshall summarized the possibly absurd results under a blood-
relation requirement, questioning the validity of an ordinance
which "permits any number of persons related by blood or mar-
riage, be it two or twenty, to live in a single household," but
which limits "the number of unrelated persons bound by profes-
sion, love, friendship, religious or political affiliation, or mere
economics who can occupy a single home.""9
The majority opinion's failing in Moore is that it gives no
guidance to the lower courts for future cases. If the related-
unrelated test is carried to its extreme, a single-family ordinance
might limit the number of unrelated individuals to one person. 0
At the other extreme, Moore might be interpreted to mean that
municipalities may place no limits whatsoever on the number of
related individuals, thus defeating the traditional purposes of
zoning."
Three other views offered by the Justices in Moore further
confuse future applications of both Moore and Belle Terre.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion perceived Belle Terre
as supportive of the Court's holding rather than distinguishable
from it."2 The Belle Terre ordinance had extended protection to
all related people; the Village knew it was powerless to interfere
with families of related individuals. East Cleveland had extended
protection only to nuclear families despite the existence of
"extended" families, especially among blacks.93 As such, the ordi-
' Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 2.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 496-97.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
But see Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
, See note 35 supra. The obvious extension of the Court's holding is that no legisla-
tion may interfere with the family, no matter now large the family is, how many cars the
family possesses, or how many children from the family enter the school system. See, e.g.,
Riverside v. Reagan, 270 Il1. App. 355 (1933) (eighteen related individuals held to be a
single family).
12 431 U.S. 494, 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 508-510.
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nance represented an "imposition by government upon the rest
of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living."94
Justice Brennan's view of Belle Terre suffers the same weak-
ness that the majority view does: Under the Moore-Belle Terre
combination, a city is powerless to regulate the number of people
allowed in single-family dewellings if they are related, but the
city may regulate the lifestyle choices of unrelated individuals,
with no apparent limitations.
Justice Stevens, concurring only in the judgment, offered a
third view of Belle Terre. 5 His actual interpretation of Belle Terre
is contained only in a footnote,96 and it is far from clear what
significance he attached to Belle Terre as precedent. Justice Ste-
vens stated that ordinances regulating the internal composition
of households, like the Belle Terre ordinance, were permissible
only if aimed at preventing transiency,97 despite the fact that his
predecessor Justice Douglas specifically ruled that the ordinance
was not aimed at transients. 8 Justice Stevens' interpretation of
Belle Terre can mean only that he would have decided Belle Terre
differently if the city had been unable to prove the effectiveness
of its ordinance in preventing transiency. Justice Stevens' basic
premise was that a property owner, not the city, has a fundamen-
tal right to decide who may reside on the property.9
The fourth and final interpretation of Belle Terre is con-
tained in Justice Stewart's dissent.100 Justice Stewart described
Belle Terre as controlling on Mrs. Moore's claimed rights of asso-
ciation and "privacy of the home."10' While he recognized the
distinction between related and unrelated persons, Justice Stew-
art stated that the mere existence of ties of kinship did not give
related persons constitutional protection superior to that given to
unrelated persons.' 2 Like the other views of Belle Terre, Justice
Stewart's opinion offers little guidance as to what extent future
zoning ordinances may regulate the internal composition of
households.
, Id. at 508.
' Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. at 519 n.15.
Id. at 519.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 7.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 513-14.
Id. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting).




Thus, Moore presented four disparate views of Belle Terre.
Reconciliation of the two cases by local authorities and their sub-
sequent application may prove difficult. Taken to extremes, Belle
Terre would allow the exclusion of all unrelated individuals, while
Moore would not allow any numerical limitation on related indi-
viduals. Should the Court now decide to step out of the zoning
arena, as it did for fifty years after Euclid, 101 forcing the states to
determine what Belle Terre and Moore really mean, confusion
may be the end result.
B. The Perimeters of the Family Right
Zoning laws encompass a great variety of definitions of fam-
ily.'10 The fact that zoning laws should be concerned with families
at all is somewhat paradoxical, since zoning was originally upheld
as a means of regulating uses of land05 without regard to who uses
the land or in what manner.06
Municipal definitions of "family" became inevitable when
zoning ordinances began to set aside certain zones for single-
family dewellings. Having upheld the power to zone, the Supreme
Court initially declined to enter the definitional controversies
that arose in lower courts.0 7 The Supreme Court intervened only
when local governments began to differ on the extent to which
they could regulate who constituted a single "family" under their
ordinances.
The decision in Moore represents the second step of the Su-
preme Court's review of permissible "families" which it began
three years earlier in Belle Terre. Though the Moore majority
attempted to distinguish the prior case, Moore is really a corollary
to the Belle Terre holding: Zoning to protect the family and
' 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) ("family" defined as
two unrelated people or more than two people related by blood, marriage, or adoption);
Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951) ("family" defined as
a single housekeeping unit); People v. Skidmore, 69 Misc. 2d 320, 329 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1971)
("family" defined as one or more persons occupying a unit as a non-profit housekeeping
unit).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
,O, See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
107 After Euclid and Nectow, see text accompanying notes 1-7 supra, the Court specif-
ically denied certiorari on several occasions. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of
Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); Stover v. New
York, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
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"family values" is permissible,' but zoning which interferes with
the family in any way must be striken.
1. Interpreting Moore's "Family"
Taken at face value, the Supreme Court's holding in Moore
is very simple. Courts will not tolerate any ordinance which limits
the right of a family to reside in a single-family dwelling:
"[W]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family
living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the im-
portance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent
to which they are served by the challenged regulation."''09 The
Supreme Court never defined the scope of this family right, but
it did rely on prior decisions in holding that the American tradi-
tion includes "uncles, aunts, cousins and especially grandparents
sharing a household along with parents and children . . .,,
Interpreting Moore in its broadest application, however,
would cause several difficulties. First of all, interpreted literally,
Moore took away the discretionary zoning power in defining the
family the Court originally awarded in Euclid. Traditionally, the
zoning power has been used to control population density and
traffic and noise levels,"' but that power was effectively curtailed
by Moore: Families, those related by blood, marriage, or adop-
tion, may live together no matter how many family members,
how many automobiles are owned, and how much they disturb
the neighborhood." 2 Related groups of eighteen or more are not
inconceivable if the house can accommodate them."3
Second, using Belle Terre and Moore, local governments may
define "family" in such a way as to legalize the social preferences
of its residents. For example, a municipality may wish to develop
a community without hippies, communes, or any unrelated peo-
ple living together without benefit of marriage. Zoning ordinances
"' Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9. The Belle Terre ordinance did allow
two unrelated people to live together, however. Justice Douglas does not explain the
correlation between "family values" and unmarried couples living together.
1" 431 U.S. at 499.
110 Id. at 504.
.. See generally J. BEUSCHER, R. WRIGHT, & M. GITELMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON
LAND USE 500-29 (2d ed. 1976); Note, The Entrenchment of the Traditional Family
Structure, 13 J. FAM. L. 901, 904 (1973-1974).
",2 Presumably, local health regulations and nuisance laws will still be available to
control excesses, but the zoning tool is eliminated as to related groups.
11 See note 91 supra.
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defining "family" as only those related by blood, marriage, or
adoption exclude these disfavored groups without regard to the
traditional purposes of zoning, minimizing traffic and noise and
protecting the environment for children." ' In effect, zoning be-
comes an instrument for social control, even though it was never
intended to be a means of excluding undesirables."'
Until the intended scope of Moore is clarified by the Supreme
Court, local authorities will have to continue their attempts to
regulate single-family districts by formulating various alterna-
tives to the restrictive scheme struck down in Moore.
2. Supreme Court Oversight: The Power to Regulate People
Proper drafting of zoning ordinances requires the enacting
muncipality to carefully formulate its objectives. If a city's sole
object is preservation of the traditional family, those related by
blood, marriage, or adoption, Belle Terre and Moore give plan-
ners the requisite judicial guidelines: A zoning ordinance may be
drafted in furtherance of "family needs" and "family values,"",
but "family" must include all blood relatives rather than the so-
called nuclear family."
7
If, however, municipalities wish to achieve other, more tradi-
tional zoning objectives, such as prevention of overcrowding and
traffic congestion"' or preservation of neighborhood character
and property values,"' restrictive definitions of "family" do little
or nothing to further these aims.12 On the contrary, such regula-
"I Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
Is Note, No Dogs, Cats or Voluntary Families Allowed, 24 DEPAuL L. REv. 784, 795
(1975); Note, An Extension of the State's Police Power: The Protection of Family Values
Through Zoning Legislation, 21 Loy. L. Rxv. 243, 247 (1975); Comment, 50 WAsH. L. Rzv.
421, 435 (1975).
HI Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9.
"' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 504-06.
"' See text accompanying note 35 supra.
"' See Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
"2 The Court in Moore recognized that the East Cleveland definition did little to
further its supposed aims:
For example, the ordinance permits any family consisting only of a husband,
wife, and unmarried children to live together, even if the family contains a
half-dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car. At the same time
it forbids an adult brother and sister to share a household, even if both
faithfully use public transportation.
431 U.S. at 500. Three years earlier, Justice Marshall made a similar point about the
marginal utility of Belle Terre's ordinance. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
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tions serve no purpose except to interfere with a property owner's
"right to use her own property as she sees fit."''
The basic failing of both East Cleveland and Belle Terre is
that in drafting their respective ordinances, they attempted to
determine who might use their single-family dwellings. Rather,
the two cities should have looked to see if restrictive definitions
of "family" bore any relation to reduction of overcrowding or
preservation of property values. 22 Quite simply, these ends can-
not be achieved by prohibiting a grandmother from living with
her grandchild'2 or prohibiting more than two unrelated people
from living together. 2 By focusing on who might occupy a single
residence, the two municipalities lost sight of zoning's proper
function, regulating the use of land for residential dwellings. A
brief overview of zoning development demonstrates how this fail-
ing came about.
Zoning began very simply. Euclid25 held that a local govern-
ment had the power to classify the use of land into three catego-
ries, residential, commercial, and industrial. Each of the three
classifications was broken down further as zoning became more
complex. Residential zones were subclassified into single-family
and multi-family uses, but the city's power to regulate was still
limited: It could regulate how a landowner used his property in
relation to his neighbors, but it could not regulate the identity of
those who used the property. When local governments began to
define "family," however, the Euclidean emphasis on land use
was subtly but definitely overthrown. Belle Terre represents more
than Supreme Court ratification of the local power to set single-
family zones; it represents judicial approval of the local power to
regulate the identity of those who use the land.
Moore is the first and to date the only limitation on that
power. But, far more significantly, Moore is a second lost oppor-
tunity to recognize and possibly reverse the changeover from
land-use to "people-use." Until the Supreme Court recognizes the
possible implications of the state's regulating the internal compo-
" Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
12 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), first enunciated a
rational relationship test in zoning. Id. at 395.
'2 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499.
2, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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sition of households, local authorities can presumably exclude
"undesirables" ' from their neighborhoods and justify the exclu-
sion under Belle Terre and Moore. As Justice Marshall concluded
three years ago:
Zoning officials properly concern themselves with uses of the
land-with, for example, the number and kind of dwellings to be
constructed in a certain neighborhood or the number of persons who
can reside in those dwellings. But zoning authorities cannot validly
consider who those persons are, what they believe, or how they
choose to live, whether they are Negro or white, Catholic or Jew,
Republican or Democrat, married or unmarried.'2
The Euclid power to govern land use was never intended to
validate the regulation of individual lifestyle choices.'28 The
courts and municipalities must recognize the growth of and the
need for limits on the power to regulate people.
CONCLUSION
The development of zoning law from Euclid and Nectow to
Belle Terre and Moore has brought with it a subtle but important
new zoning power. Not only do localities have the power to regu-
late uses on the land; they have also acquired the power to regu-
late the people who use the land. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has failed to address the evolution of this new power, at-
tempting to evaluate the scope of that power with respect to
traditional objectives the old power was supposed to achieve. The
result of this failure is that the Court has upheld zoning ordi-
nances which determine the internal composition of households
without ever questioning the purpose of such regulation.
Recognition that there must be limitations on the power to
govern the composition of households is the first step toward
reversing the trend. Local governments must have the power to
control use of the land, but that power should not be expansively
construed to allow control of who uses the land or in what man-
ner.
Belle Terre and Moore must be reanalyzed. The power to
decide whether a piece of property may be used for residential,
I' See text accompanying note 115 supra.
121 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 14-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"2 Note, An Extension of the State's Police Power: The Protection of Family Values
Through Zoning Legislation, 21 Loy. L. REv. 243, 247 (1975).
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commercial, or industrial purposes belongs to the state. The
power to decide who resides on a piece of residential property
properly belongs-and must be returned-to the property owner.
David W Miller

